the british perspective to july 1916
The German Army at Thiepval had identified, occupied and clinically fortified the most favourable positions above the banks of the Ancre at Thiepval. When i first visited the battlefield many years ago, three things struck me. The first was just how exposed the slopes were leading from the edge of Thiepval Wood to the German Front line. The second was that the attack would have to be made up hill. It was long and gradual.The third was that with nearly every other part of the Somme battlefield, the German positions totally overlooked and commanded the British lines. It is not appreciated unless you stand somewhere along the German Front line and look down over Thiepval Wood which must have given those troops forming up there for the attack a false sense of safety. The British advance was totally exposed and this was ideal machine-gun country.
However, there was great optimism and pride amongst the men being assembled in this area and whose task it would be to take Thiepval and the surrounding positions.
However, there was great optimism and pride amongst the men being assembled in this area and whose task it would be to take Thiepval and the surrounding positions.
The below film gives a good account of the situation at this stage in the preperations
The three divisions under the command of X Corps contrasted sharply in both their origins and character. The 49th Division was a Territorial Force from the West Riding of Yorkshire. They took no part in the initial assault on the 1st of July and their subsequent deployment later in the day was marked by indecision and had little impact. The 32nd Division which would be on the right hand side of the Ulsters attack were rather typical of many of the mainland New Army divisions raised by Kitchener. Each of the three brigades was strengthened or stiffened by one regular battalion. The other units in each brigade were service battalions raised soon after the outbreak of the war from Comminites in northern England and Scotland. It does make one think that if Thiepval was going to be such a ' hard nut ' to crack, why the British Staff did not use more regular battalions in this area.
The 36th Ulster Division however was unique in that unlike many other New Army divisions the Ulstermen were not divided and split up in the weeks after they left the UK in order to allow a stiffening of regulars. Major General Oliver Nugent was exceptionally proud of his division, and the men under his command, which had arrived in France during October 1915. They came from every corner in the Ulster. It was a division of work-place friends. They wanted to prove themselves in battle and their chance would soon arrive.The objectives which had been identified to these two assault divisions made clear that a deep penetration of the German positions was expected. The 36th Ulster Division faced a difficulty in that their fianl objectives on the German second positions fanned out into a much wider frontage than that facing the initial assault across the front lines. Therefore the original plan of attack devised by Nugent's 36th Division did not envisage a frontal attack on Schwaben from from the west across the Thiepval Road but was to attack St . Pierre Divion directly and then the slopes leading up to the Schwaben Redoubt from the north-west, thereby avoiding the effects of machine-gun fire from Thiepval fort should that village not fall to the 32nd Division. However, although this plan had already been rehearsed it was abandoned at the request of Major-General Rycroft, GOC 32nd Division, who believed that it would not deliver sufficient support to his men attacking Thiepval. As a consequence the Ulsterman's attack was moved right, leaving St. Pierre Divion to be surrounded and pinched out later. It was anticipated that all along the Thiepval front the 36th and 32nd Divisions would be in possession of the German second lines defences, the ' D ' lines roughly 2,000 yards to the rear of Thiepval, by the close of their first day's advance, two hours and forty minutes after zero hour. They were therefore expected to have achieved an advance from their own front lines averaging one and a half miles. It was a fearsome task. The revised plan involved the assault brigades in reaching the Schwaben Redoubt and the intermediate positions of the Hansa Line in the case of the36th Ulsters, and Thiepval Village and the Mouquet Switch Line in the case of the 32nd, before the support brigades took over for the final assault on the relevant parts of the German Second Line positions. The artillery plans were therefore very complex. This in itself caused drastic problems as the artillery support was not flexible enough to support local commanders and was set to a rigid time scale which higher staff officers were not willing to alter. For example in front of the Ulsters after the final intensive bombardment the barrage would lift from the front line onto the German ' A1 ' lines and from there onto the 'B' lines three minutes later at which location the barrage would stay for a further 15 minutes and so on. It was almost as if the men were supporting the barrage rather than the barrage supporting them and there are countless stories of men being hit and killed by their own barrage where they had advanced to quickly.
The 36th Ulster Division however was unique in that unlike many other New Army divisions the Ulstermen were not divided and split up in the weeks after they left the UK in order to allow a stiffening of regulars. Major General Oliver Nugent was exceptionally proud of his division, and the men under his command, which had arrived in France during October 1915. They came from every corner in the Ulster. It was a division of work-place friends. They wanted to prove themselves in battle and their chance would soon arrive.The objectives which had been identified to these two assault divisions made clear that a deep penetration of the German positions was expected. The 36th Ulster Division faced a difficulty in that their fianl objectives on the German second positions fanned out into a much wider frontage than that facing the initial assault across the front lines. Therefore the original plan of attack devised by Nugent's 36th Division did not envisage a frontal attack on Schwaben from from the west across the Thiepval Road but was to attack St . Pierre Divion directly and then the slopes leading up to the Schwaben Redoubt from the north-west, thereby avoiding the effects of machine-gun fire from Thiepval fort should that village not fall to the 32nd Division. However, although this plan had already been rehearsed it was abandoned at the request of Major-General Rycroft, GOC 32nd Division, who believed that it would not deliver sufficient support to his men attacking Thiepval. As a consequence the Ulsterman's attack was moved right, leaving St. Pierre Divion to be surrounded and pinched out later. It was anticipated that all along the Thiepval front the 36th and 32nd Divisions would be in possession of the German second lines defences, the ' D ' lines roughly 2,000 yards to the rear of Thiepval, by the close of their first day's advance, two hours and forty minutes after zero hour. They were therefore expected to have achieved an advance from their own front lines averaging one and a half miles. It was a fearsome task. The revised plan involved the assault brigades in reaching the Schwaben Redoubt and the intermediate positions of the Hansa Line in the case of the36th Ulsters, and Thiepval Village and the Mouquet Switch Line in the case of the 32nd, before the support brigades took over for the final assault on the relevant parts of the German Second Line positions. The artillery plans were therefore very complex. This in itself caused drastic problems as the artillery support was not flexible enough to support local commanders and was set to a rigid time scale which higher staff officers were not willing to alter. For example in front of the Ulsters after the final intensive bombardment the barrage would lift from the front line onto the German ' A1 ' lines and from there onto the 'B' lines three minutes later at which location the barrage would stay for a further 15 minutes and so on. It was almost as if the men were supporting the barrage rather than the barrage supporting them and there are countless stories of men being hit and killed by their own barrage where they had advanced to quickly.
The above photograph is the view a German machine-gunner would have had across No Man's Land when theUlsters attacked on the morning of 1st July 1916. The photograph was taken from the vicinity of Thiepval Village. It shows just how exposed the Ulsters were when they advanced across No Man's Land towards the German Front Line . The Ulsters left their front line trenches at the edge of Thiepval Wood which can be seen on the left. They would have advanced up hill to the small copse in the middle distance which now surrounds the Ulster Tower , this was where the German front line was situated. (there was no copse here on 1st July 1916) The Ulsters would have continued their advance and headed towards the German second line which was over the ridge line and out of view. Mill Road Cemetray can be seen on the right of the hill. The whole of this area would have been completely swept by machine-gun fire , and it was across this 'killing ground ' that support troops from the 36th Division would have had to cross to help those men who were fighting in the Schwaben Redoubt. It was in the small wood behind the Ulster Tower , many years ago when i first visited the Somme that i found piecse of soldiers boots still laying about, they still had the hobnails in them, also numerous large pieces of shrapnel and live mills grenades laying next to some shell craters. I brought some of the shrapnel back and threw one of the grenades!!
