On the left the attack of the Indian Brigade was quickly halted except along the Aegean shore where the 1/6th Battalion of the Gurkha Rifles managed to advance. The 14th Battalion of King George's Own ferozepore Sikhs Regiment, advancing along the floor of Gully Ravine, were almost wiped out losing 380 men out of 514 and 80% of their officers.
The 2nd Battalion of the Hampshire Regiment from the 29th Division, advancing along Fir Tree Spur alongside Gully Ravine, managed to advance but having lost contact with the Sikhs on their left were forced to defend along the bank of the ravine as well as to their front. Elsewhere the 29th Division advance was held up with heavy casualties by Turkish strongpoints that had survived the bombardment unscratched.
The 2nd Battalion of the Hampshire Regiment from the 29th Division, advancing along Fir Tree Spur alongside Gully Ravine, managed to advance but having lost contact with the Sikhs on their left were forced to defend along the bank of the ravine as well as to their front. Elsewhere the 29th Division advance was held up with heavy casualties by Turkish strongpoints that had survived the bombardment unscratched.
the 29th Division
The advance of the 42nd Division was, by Gallipoli standards, very successful, quickly reaching the first objective of the Turkish trenches and moving beyond to advance a total of 1000 yards. This attack was made by the 127th ( Manchester ) Brigade which broke through the Turkish 9th Division's defences and captured 217 prisoners.
The Royal Naval Division's advance was led by the 2nd Naval Brigade which managed to reach and capture the Turkish trenches. When the second wave, the Collingwood Battalion, attempted to continue the advance they were caught in enfilade fire from Kereves Dere to the right where the French advance had failed. The battalion, one of the newly arrived reinforcements, was utterly annihilated and was never reformed. Further attempts to reach the second objective were successful but the position was untenable so within a couple of hours the RND units had retreated to their starting position.
The Royal Naval Division's advance was led by the 2nd Naval Brigade which managed to reach and capture the Turkish trenches. When the second wave, the Collingwood Battalion, attempted to continue the advance they were caught in enfilade fire from Kereves Dere to the right where the French advance had failed. The battalion, one of the newly arrived reinforcements, was utterly annihilated and was never reformed. Further attempts to reach the second objective were successful but the position was untenable so within a couple of hours the RND units had retreated to their starting position.
Left, men of the Royal Naval Division in a heavily sand-bagged trench. Note the soldier holding up a trench periscope. Right, men of the Division charging from a trench. The surrounding high ground made such attacks very vunerable.
With the main attack decided - success for the 42nd Division in the centre, failure everywhere else -
Hunter-Weston considered how to deploy his reserves. If he were to exploit the success in the centre there was the potential to set the Turkish flanks to flight but also the danger of creating a vulnerable salient. He decided to reinforce the flanks and renew that attack however the French insisted they were unable to continue the offensive so any further advances by the Royal Naval Division in Achi Baba Nullah were abandoned. Further attacks along Gully Spur and Gully Ravine failed.
In hindsight, the failure not to exploit the success of the 42nd Division may have robbed the Allies of an important victory which would have enabled access to Achi Baba and could have changed the course of the whole campaign. At 4pm Hunter-Weston ordered the troops to dig in and consolidate their positions however this coincided with the Turkish reserves counter-attacking against the Manchester Brigade in the centre. Within one hour the brigade was under attack from three sides so was eventually ordered to withdraw. By the end of the battle their new front line was a mere 200 to 250 yards in front of their start line, passing through a patch of vines that earned the area the name of ' The Vineyard ' which was to be the site of heavy fighting in August.
Hunter-Weston considered how to deploy his reserves. If he were to exploit the success in the centre there was the potential to set the Turkish flanks to flight but also the danger of creating a vulnerable salient. He decided to reinforce the flanks and renew that attack however the French insisted they were unable to continue the offensive so any further advances by the Royal Naval Division in Achi Baba Nullah were abandoned. Further attacks along Gully Spur and Gully Ravine failed.
In hindsight, the failure not to exploit the success of the 42nd Division may have robbed the Allies of an important victory which would have enabled access to Achi Baba and could have changed the course of the whole campaign. At 4pm Hunter-Weston ordered the troops to dig in and consolidate their positions however this coincided with the Turkish reserves counter-attacking against the Manchester Brigade in the centre. Within one hour the brigade was under attack from three sides so was eventually ordered to withdraw. By the end of the battle their new front line was a mere 200 to 250 yards in front of their start line, passing through a patch of vines that earned the area the name of ' The Vineyard ' which was to be the site of heavy fighting in August.
Aftermath
The objectives of the Third Battle of Krithia had been more realistic than the previous attempts but it ended in failure all the same with only small gains in ground. Both sides were severely stretched following the battle. If the British had the troops to resume the attack on the following day, the Turks believed they would not have been able to hold. As it was the Turks launched a counter-attack against the 29th Division at the Vineyard on June 6th, and the British came close to breaking. Second Lieutenat G.R.D Moor of the Hampshire regiment woould be awarded the VC, but would also shoot four of his own men in order to stop his men from retreating under the pressure of a Turkish attack. At this stage in the campaign it was not just the machine gun bullets, grenades and artillery that men had to worry about as the below film will show.
